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Cascades of Infection
Richard J. La
Abstract—We investigate cascades in networks consisting of
strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the
strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting
themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some) risks, and
iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study
how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection
propagation rate, and the probability with which infected nodes
transmit infection to neighbors, affect nodes’ choices at Nash
equilibria and the resultant price of anarchy/stability. In addition,
we examine how the probability that a single infected node
can spread the infection to a significant portion of the entire
network, called cascade probability, behaves with respect to
system parameters. In particular, we demonstrate that, at least
for some parameter regimes, the cascade probability increases
with the average degree of nodes.
Index Terms—Cascade, contagion, interdependent security,
population game, price of anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the topic of interdependent security (IDS) [18]
has gained much attention from research communities. IDS
arises naturally in many areas including cybersecurity, airline
security, and smart power grid, just to name a few. Ensuring
adequate security of such critical infrastructure and systems
has emerged as one of most important engineering and societal
challenges today.
There are several key difficulties in tackling IDS in large
networks. First, as the name suggests, the security of individual
entities is dependent on those of others. Second, these entities
are often strategic and are interested only in their own objec-
tives with little or no regards for the well being of the others.
Third, any attempt to capture and study detailed interactions
among a large number of (strategic) entities suffers from the
curse of dimensionality.
Although there are no standard metrics on which experts
agree for measuring or quantifying system-level security, one
popular approach researchers take to measure the security of a
network is to see how easily an infection can spread through a
network. In particular, researchers often study the probability
with which an infection will propagate to a significant or
nonnegligible fraction of the network, starting with a single
infected node in the network, which we call cascade proba-
bility.
We study the cascade probability in a network composed
of strategic agents or nodes representing, for instance, orga-
nizations (e.g., companies) or network domains. The edges in
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the network are not necessarily physical edges. Instead, they
could be logical, operational or relational edges (e.g., business
transactions or information sharing). The degree of a node is
defined to be the number of neighbors or incident edges it has
in the network.1
In our setting, there are malicious entities, called attackers,
which launch attacks against the nodes in the network, for
example, in hopes of infecting the machines or gaining unau-
thorized access to information of victims. Moreover, when the
attacks are successful, their victims also unknowingly launch
indirect attacks on their neighbors. For this reason, when a
node is vulnerable to attacks, it also heightens the risk of its
neighbors as well, thereby introducing a negative network ex-
ternality and influencing the choices of its neighbors. Network
externality is also known as network effect [38].
Faced with the possibility of being attacked either directly
by malicious attackers or indirectly by their neighbors, nodes
may find that it is in their own interests to invest in protecting
themselves against possible attacks, e.g., firewalls, network
intrusion detection tools, incoming traffic monitoring, etc.
Moreover, they may also consider purchasing insurance to
mitigate their financial losses in case they fall victim to
successful attacks. To capture these choices available to nodes,
in our model each node can select from three admissible
actions – Protection (P ), Insurance (I) and No Action (N ).
When a node picks N , it assumes all of the risk from damages
or losses brought on by successful attacks.
In practice, a node may be able to both invest in protecting
itself and purchase insurance at the same time. However,
because insurance merely transfers risk from the insured to
the insurer, a purchase of insurance by a node that also invests
in protection does not affect the preferences of other nodes.
Therefore, not modeling the possibility of simultaneous invest-
ment in protection and insurance by a node does not change
other nodes’ decisions to protect themselves. Moreover, both
overall social costs, i.e., the sum of losses due to attacks and
investments in protection, and cascade probability depend only
on which nodes elect to invest in protection. Therefore, leaving
out the choice of simultaneous protection and insurance does
not alter our main findings on the price of anarchy/stability
(POA/POS) [20] and cascade probability, which are explained
shortly.
As mentioned earlier, a major hurdle to studying IDS in a
large network consisting of many nodes is that it is difficult, if
not impossible, to model the details of interactions among all
nodes. To skirt this difficulty, we employ a population game
1We assume that the network is modeled as an undirected graph in the
paper. If the network was modeled as a directed graph instead, the degree
distribution of players we are interested in would be that of in-degrees.
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model [35]. A population game is often used to model the
interactions between many players, possibly from different
populations. While the population game model is clearly a
simplification of a complicated reality, we believe that our
findings based on this scalable model offer helpful insights
into more realistic scenarios.
For our study, we adopt a well known solution concept,
Nash equilibrium (NE) of the population game, as an approxi-
mation to nodes’ behavior in practice. Our goal is to investigate
how the network effects present in IDS shape the POA/POS
and cascade probability as different system parameters (e.g.,
node degree distribution and infection propagation rate) are
varied.
The POA (resp. POS) is defined to be the largest (resp.
smallest) ratio between the social cost at an NE and the
smallest achievable social cost. The POS can be viewed as
the minimum price one needs to pay for stability among the
players so that no player would have an incentive to deviate
from its strategy unilaterally. Both POS and POA have recently
gained much attention as a means to measure the inefficiency
of NEs for different games (e.g., [20], [31], [34]).
Our main findings and contributions can be summarized as
follows:
1) There exists a threshold on degree of populations so
that only the populations with degree greater than or
equal to the threshold invest in protection. This degree
threshold decreases with an increasing propagation rate
of infection and the probability of indirect attacks on
neighbors.
2) In general, there may not be a unique NE of a population
game. However, the size of each population investing
in protection is identical at all NEs. Consequently, the
overall social cost and cascade probability are the same
for all NEs, and the POA and the POS are identical.
3) We provide an upper bound on the POA/POS, which
is a function of the average degree of populations and
increases superlinearly with the average degree in many
cases. Moreover, it is tight in the sense that we can find
scenarios for which the POA is equal to the bound.
4) In many cases, the population size investing in protection
tends to climb with the average degree, the infection
propagation rate, and the probability of indirect attack
on neighbors. Somewhat surprisingly, the cascade prob-
ability also increases at the same time as the average
degree or indirect attack probability rises.
We suspect that this observation is a consequence of
the following: As more of the population invests in
protection, it produces higher positive network external-
ities on other unprotected nodes. These greater positive
externalities in turn cause free riding by some nodes with
larger degrees which would have chosen to protect when
the parameters were smaller. These vulnerable nodes
with larger degrees then provide better venues for an
infection to spread, escalating the cascade probability
as a result.
We point out that our analysis of cascades is carried out
under a simplifying assumption that local neighborhoods of
nodes are tree-like. While this assumption is reasonable for
sparse networks, it may not hold in some of real-world
networks that have been shown to exhibit much stronger local
clustering than many of random graph models [36], [43]. For
such networks with higher clustering among neighbors and
cycles in local neighborhoods, our findings may not be directly
applicable.
In addition, we note that actual security investments in
practice will likely vary considerably from one realized net-
work to another, even when the node degrees are identical.
Moreover, in some cases, the exact network topology may be
unknown and hard to obtain. For these reasons, it is difficult
and, perhaps, uninformative to study the effects of node degree
distribution on the basis of a limited number of random
networks. Instead, we aim to capture the mean behavior of
nodes without fixing the network topology. It is our hope that
even this simple model will help us understand the qualitative
nature of aggregate behavior of nodes and shed some light on
how the underlying structure of interdependency in security
shapes their security decisions and resulting network-level
security in more realistic settings.
To the best of our knowledge, our work presented here
(along with [22], in which we explore local network security
seen by individual nodes and a structural relation between
an NE and a social optimum) is the first study to investigate
the effects of network properties and other system parameters
on interdependent security in networks of strategic entities.
Although our study is based on a population game model that
does not capture microscopic strategic interactions among indi-
vidual nodes, we believe that it approximates the macroscopic
behavior of the nodes and our findings shed some light on how
the underlying network topology and other system parameters
may influence the choices of nodes in practice and shape the
resulting network security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize
some of most closely related studies in Section II. Section
III outlines the population game model we adopt for our
analysis and presents the questions of interest to us. Section
IV discusses our main analytical results on the properties of
NEs and the POA/POS, which are complemented by numerical
results in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Due to a large volume of literature related to security and
cascades of infection, an attempt to summarize the existing
studies will be an unproductive exercise. Instead, we only
select several key studies that are most relevant to our study
and discuss them briefly. Furthermore, for a summary of
related literature on IDS, we refer an interested reader to [22],
[25] and references therein. Here, we focus on the literature
related to cascades and contagion.
First, Watts in his seminal paper [44] studied the following
question: Consider a network with n nodes whose degree
distribution is given by p = (pk; k ∈ Z+), where Z+ :=
{0, 1, 2, . . .}. Suppose that we randomly choose a single node
and infect it. Given this, what is the probability that a large
number of nodes will be infected, starting with the single
infected node, i.e., there is a (global) cascade of infection?
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Obviously, the answer to this question depends on how the
infection spreads. In Watts’ model, each node i has a random
threshold Θi ∈ [0, 1], and it becomes infected once the fraction
of its neighbors that are infected exceeds Θi.
In his analysis, rather than deriving a global cascade con-
dition for finite networks, he considers an infinite network
in which each node has degree k with probability pk, inde-
pendently of others. Using a generating function approach,
he then studies the condition under which the largest cluster
of vulnerable nodes percolates, which he calls the cascade
condition. Here, a node is vulnerable if its threshold is smaller
than the inverse of its degree.
A somewhat surprising finding in his study is that as the
average or mean degree of nodes increases, the network goes
through two critical (phase) transitions: Initially, when the
average degree is very small, the network is stable in that
the cascade probability is (near) zero. As the average degree
climbs, after the first transition the network experiences cas-
cades with nonnegligible probability. However, as the average
degree rises further, at some point, the network becomes stable
again and cascades do not occur frequently, i.e., the cascade
probability becomes very small once again.
Gleeson and Cahalane [16] extended the work of Watts.
In their model, they assumed that a certain fraction of total
population is infected at the beginning, and showed that the
existence of cascades exhibits high sensitivity to the size of
initially infected population.
Coupechoux and Lelarge examined the influence of cluster-
ing in social networks on diffusions and contagions in random
networks [12], [13]. In particular, they proposed a new random
graph model where some nodes are replaced by cliques of
size equal to the degrees of the nodes. Their key findings
include the observation that, in the symmetric threshold model,
the effects of clustering on contagion threshold depend on
the mean node degree; for small mean degrees, clustering
impedes contagion, whereas for large mean degrees, contagion
is facilitated by clustering.
An observation similar to Watts’ finding has been reported
in different fields, including financial markets where banks
and financial institutions (FIs) are interconnected through their
overlapping investment portfolios and other (credit) exposures
[2], [6], [7], [15]. In a simple model [6], two FIs are connected
if they share a common asset in their investment portfolios, and
the average degree of FIs depends on the number of available
assets and how diverse their portfolios are, i.e., how many
assets each FI owns. An interesting finding is that when the
number of overlapping assets of FIs is small, the market is
stable in that it can tolerate a failure of a few FIs without
affecting other FIs significantly. As they begin to diversify
their portfolios and spread their investments across a larger set
of assets, the market becomes unstable in that a failure of even
one or two FIs triggers a domino effect, causing many other
FIs to collapse shortly after. However, when they diversify
their investment portfolios even further and include a very
large set of assets, the market becomes stable again.
Watts’ model has also been extended to scenarios where
nodes are connected by more than one type of network, e.g.,
social network vs. professional network [5], [45]. For example,
Yag˘an and Gligor [45] investigated scenarios where nodes are
connected via two or more networks with varying edge-level
influence. In their model, each node switches from “good” to
“infected” when
∑
ci ·mi/
∑
ci · ki exceeds some threshold,
where ki and mi are the total number of neighbors and infected
neighbors, respectively, of the node in the ith network, and ci
reflects the relative influence of the edges in the ith network.
Their main finding related to the impact of average degree is
similar in nature to that of Watts [44].
In another related study, Beale et al. [2] studied the behavior
of strategic banks interested in minimizing their own probabil-
ities of failure. They showed that banks can lower own proba-
bility of failure by diversifying their risks and spreading across
assets. But, if banks follow similar diversification strategies, it
can cause a (nearly) simultaneous collapse of multiple banks,
thereby potentially compromising the stability of the whole
financial market. This finding points to a tension between the
stability of individual banks and that of the financial system.
Although the authors did not attempt to quantify the loss of
stability, this degradation in system stability is closely related
to well known inefficiency of NEs [14], [31], [33].
We point out an important difference between the findings
in the studies by Watts and others [6], [7], [44] and ours: In
our model, the nodes are strategic and can actively protect
themselves when it is in their own interests to do so. In
such scenarios, as the average degree increases, in many cases
the network becomes more vulnerable in that the cascade
probability rises despite that more nodes protect themselves
(Section V). This somewhat counterintuitive observation is a
sharp departure from the findings of [44], [45].
This discrepancy is mainly caused by the following. In the
model studied by Watts and others, the thresholds of nodes are
given by independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables (rvs), and their distribution does not depend on the
average degree or node degrees. Due to this independence of
the distribution of thresholds on degrees, as the average degree
increases, a larger number of neighbors need to be infected
before a node switches to an “infected” state. For this reason,
nodes become less vulnerable. Since only a single node is
infected at the beginning, diminishing vulnerability of nodes
makes it harder for the infection to propagate to a large portion
of the network.
In contrast, in a network comprising strategic players with
heterogeneous degrees, at least for some parameter regimes,
we observe free riding by nodes with smaller degrees. A
similar free riding is also observed in the context of informa-
tion reliability [40]. Interestingly, as we show in Section IV,
when the average degree rises, both the fraction of protected
population and the degree threshold mentioned in Section I
tend to climb, at least in some parameter space of interest
(Section V).
We suspect that the upturn in degree threshold is a con-
sequence of stronger positive network externalities produced
by the investments in protection by an increasing number of
higher degree nodes; greater positive externalities cause some
nodes with larger degrees, which would protect themselves
when the average degree was smaller, to free ride instead. As
stated in Section I, these unprotected nodes with increasing
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degrees allow an initial infection to propagate throughout the
network more easily, leading to larger cascade probability.
In [22], we carry out a related study with some emphasis
on cybersecurity. However, its model is different from that
employed here: [22] assumes that infections spread only
to immediate neighbors, whereas the current model allows
infections to transmit multiple hops. On the other hand, instead
of binary security choices assumed here, in [22] we allow M
(M ≥ 1) different protection levels nodes can select from, in
order to capture varying cybersecurity measures they can pick.
Also, an insurer may require a minimum level of protection
before a node can purchase insurance, and the insurance
premium may depend on the node’s protection level.
More importantly, besides the differences in their models,
there are major disparities in the main focus and key findings
of these two studies. While both studies aim to understand
how network security is influenced by system parameters, we
examine in [22] network security from the viewpoint of a node
with a fixed degree as the node degree distribution varies.
A main finding of [22] is that, as the degree distribution
of neighbors becomes (stochastically) larger, under a set of
assumptions, the average risk seen from neighbors tends to
diminish at NEs. In this sense, from the standpoint of a node
with a fixed degree, the network security improves and, as a
result, the security investments of nodes with a fixed degree
decline. Finally, [22] also investigates the structural relation
between an NE and a social optimum that minimizes the
overall social cost, with the goal of identifying a possible
means of internalizing the externalities produced by nodes
[41].
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The nodes2 in a network representing private companies
or organizations are likely to be interested only in their own
objectives. Thus, we assume that they are strategic and model
their interactions as a noncooperative game, in which players
are the nodes in the network.
We focus on scenarios where the number of nodes is
very large. Unfortunately, as stated before, modeling detailed
interactions among many nodes and analyzing ensuing games
is challenging, if possible at all. A main difficulty is that the
number of possible strategy profiles we need to consider grows
exponentially with the number of players, and characterizing
the NEs of games is often demanding even with a modest
number of players. Moreover, even when the NEs can be
computed, it is often difficult to draw insight from them.
For analytical tractability, we employ a population game
model [35]. Population games provide a unified framework and
tools for studying strategic interactions among a large number
of agents under following assumptions [35]. First, the choice of
an individual agent has very little effect on the payoffs of other
agents. Second, there are finitely many populations of agents,
and each agent is a member of exactly one population. Third,
the payoff of each agent depends only on the distribution of
actions chosen by members of each population. In other words,
2We will use the words nodes and players interchangeably in the remainder
of the manuscript.
if two agents belonging to the same population swap their
actions, it does not change the payoffs of other agents. For a
detailed discussion of population games, we refer an interested
reader to the manuscript by Sandholm [35].
Our population game model does not capture the micro-
scopic edge level interactions between every pair of neighbors.
Instead, it attempts to capture the mean behavior of nodes
with varying degrees, without assuming any given network.
An advantage of this model is that it provides a scalable
model that enables us to study the effects of various system
parameters on the overall system security regardless of the
network size. Moreover, the spirit behind our population game
model is in line with that of Watts’ model [44] and its
extensions (e.g., [16], [45]).
The notation we adopt throughout the paper is listed in
Table I.
A (pure) action space (A = {I,N, P})
C cost function of population game
Cd,a(x) cost of a node from pop. d playing action a
D set of node degrees (D = {1, 2, . . . , Dmax})
Dmax maximum degree among nodes
Ins(x, d) insurance payout to an insured node from pop. d
K maximum hop distance an infection can propagate
LP expected loss from an attack for a protected node
LU expected loss from an attack for a unprotected node
∆L LU − LP
N(m,K, βIA) a Nash equilibrium for given m, K and βIA
cP cost of protection
cI insurance premium
davg average or mean degree of nodes
dNE degree threshold at a Nash equilibrium
e(x) risk exposure at social state x
fd or fd(m) fraction of pop. with degree d
gd,a fraction of pop. d playing action a (gd,a = xd,a/md)
m pop. size vector (m = (md; d ∈ D))
md mass or size of pop. d
piP prob. of infection for protected nodes
piU prob. of infection for unprotected nodes
∆p piU − piP
wd or wd(m) weighted fraction of pop. with degree d
x social state (x = (xd; d ∈ D))
xd pop. state of pop. d (xd = (xd,a; a ∈ A))
xd,a size of pop. d playing action a
y?(m,K, βIA) a social optimum for given m, K and βIA
βIA prob. of indirect attack on a neighbor
γ(x) prob. that a node will experience an indirect attack
from a neighbor when the neighbor is attacked
τDA prob. that a node experiences a direct attack
ξcov fraction of insurance coverage over deductible
TABLE I
NOTATION (pop. = population, prob. = probability).
A. Population game
We assume that the maximum degree among all nodes
is Dmax < ∞. For each d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Dmax} =: D,
population d consists of all nodes with common degree d.3
We denote the mass or size of population d by md, and
m :=
(
md; d ∈ D
)
is the population size vector that tells
3Since population d, d ∈ D, comprises all nodes with degree d, we also
refer to d as the degree of population d hereafter. In addition, we implicitly
assume that there is no isolated node with d = 0; since isolated nodes do not
interact with any other nodes, they are of little interest to us.
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us the sizes of populations with different degrees. Note that
md does not necessarily represent the number of agents in
population d; instead, an implicit modeling assumption is that
each population consists of so many agents that a population
d ∈ D can be approximated as a continuum of mass or size
md ∈ (0,∞).4
All players have the same action space A := {I,N, P}
consisting of three actions – Insurance (I), No Action (N ), and
Protection (P ).5 Investment in protection effectively reduces
potential damages or losses, hence, the risk for the player.
In contrast, as mentioned before, insurance simply shifts
the risk from the insured to the insurer, without affecting
the overall societal cost [28]. For this reason, we focus on
understanding how underlying network properties and other
system parameters govern the choices of players to protect
themselves as a function of their degrees and ensuing social
costs.
i. Population states and social state – We denote by
xd =
(
xd,a; a ∈ A
)
, where
∑
a∈A xd,a = md, the population
state of population d. The elements xd,a, a ∈ A, represent
the mass or size of population d which employs action a.
Define x :=
(
xd; d ∈ D
)
to be the social state. Let
Xd :=
{
xd ∈ IR3+ |
∑
a∈A xd,a = md
}
, where IR+ := [0,∞),
and X := ∏d∈D Xd.
ii. Costs – The cost function of the game is denoted by
C : X → IR3Dmax . For each admissible social state x ∈ X ,
the cost of a player from population d playing action a ∈ A
is equal to Cd,a(x). In addition to the cost of investing in
protection or purchasing insurance, the costs depend on (i)
expected losses from attacks and (ii) insurance coverage when
a player is insured.
In order to explore how network effects and system pa-
rameters determine the preferences of players, we model two
different types of attacks players experience – direct and
indirect. While the first type of attacks are not dependent on
the network, the latter depends critically on the underlying
network and system parameters, thereby allowing us to capture
the desired network effects on players’ choices.
a) Direct attacks: We assume that malicious attacker(s)
launch an attack on each node with probability τDA, indepen-
dently of other players.6 We call this a direct attack. When a
player experiences a direct attack, its (expected) cost depends
on whether or not it is protected; if the player is protected, its
cost is given by LP . Otherwise, its cost is equal to LU (> LP ).
These costs can be interpreted in many different ways. We
take the following interpretation in this paper. Assume that
each attack leads to a successful infection with some proba-
bility that depends on the action chosen by the player. When
the player plays P , an attack is successful with probability piP ,
4The degree-based model we adopt in the study is often known as the
Chung-Lu model [9] or the configuration model [29], [30].
5There are other studies where the investment in security is restricted
to a binary case, e.g., [4], [21], [27]. In addition, while various insurance
contracts may be available on the market in practice, as mentioned earlier,
since insurance does not affect the preferences of other players, we believe that
the qualitative nature of our findings will hold even when different insurance
contracts are offered.
6Our model can be altered to capture the intensity or frequencies of attacks
instead, with appropriate changes to cost functions of the players.
in which case the cost to the player is given by some rv CP .
Otherwise, the probability of successful infection is piU and
the player’s cost is given by rv CU , whose distribution may
be different from that of CP . Then, the expected cost due to an
infection when attacked is equal to piP ·E [CP ] when a player
is protected and piU · E [CU ] otherwise. One can view these
expected costs piP · E [CP ] and piU · E [CU ] as LP and LU ,
respectively, in our model. Throughout the paper, we assume
0 ≤ piP < piU ≤ 1 and denote the difference LU − LP by
∆L > 0.
b) Indirect attacks: Besides the direct attacks by malicious
attackers, a player may also experience indirect attacks from
its neighbors that are victims of successful attacks and are
infected. In order to control the manner in which infections
spread in the network via indirect attacks, we introduce two
parameters. First, we assume that an infected node will launch
an indirect attack on each of its neighbors with probability
βIA ∈ (0, 1] independently of each other. We call βIA
indirect attack probability (IAP). Second, an infection due
to a successful direct attack can propagate only up to K ∈
IN := {1, 2, 3, . . .} hops from its victim.7 The IAP βIA
primarily affects the local spreading behavior, whereas the
parameter K influences how quickly an infection can spread
before appropriate countermeasures are taken, e.g., a release
of patches or vaccines. Clearly, as K increases, the infection
can potentially spread to a larger portion of the network.
In our model, we assume that the IAP is the same whether
the infected node is protected or not, which is reasonable in
some cases, e.g., spread of computer viruses or worms. But,
in some other scenarios, this assumption may not hold. For
instance, in a disease epidemic scenario, e.g., flu, those who
are vaccinated are not only less likely to contract the disease,
but also more likely to recover faster than those who are not
vaccinated, thereby reducing the odds of transmitting it to
others around them even if they become infected.
Based on the above assumptions, we proceed to derive the
cost function C for our population game. Let us denote the
mapping that yields the degree distribution of populations by
f : IRDmax+ → [0, 1]Dmax , where
fd(m) =
md∑
d′∈Dmd′
, m ∈ IRDmax+ and d ∈ D,
is the fraction of total population with degree d. Similarly,
define w : IRDmax+ → [0, 1]Dmax , where
wd(m) =
d ·md∑
d′∈D d′ ·md′
, m ∈ IRDmax+ and d ∈ D. (1)
It is clear from the above definition that w gives us the
weighted degree distribution of populations, where the weights
are the degrees.
Clearly, both f and w are scale invariant. In other words,
f(m) = f(φ ·m) and w(m) = w(φ ·m) for all φ > 0. When
there is no confusion, we write f and w in place of f(m) and
w(m), respectively.
We explain the role of the mapping w briefly. Suppose
that we fix a social state x ∈ X and choose a player. The
7This parameter K can instead be viewed as an average hop distance
infections spread with appropriate changes to the cost function.
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probability that a randomly picked neighbor of the chosen
player belongs to population d ∈ D is approximately wd
because it is proportional to the degree d [8], [44].8 Hence,
the probability that the neighbor has degree d and plays
action a ∈ A is roughly wd · xd,a/md. We will use these
approximations throughout the paper.
Let Γk(x), k ∈ IN, denote the expected number of indirect
attacks a node, say i, experiences through a single neighbor,
say j, due to successful direct attacks on nodes that are k
hops away from node i. Based on the above observation, we
approximate Γk(x) as follows under the assumption that the
K-hop neighborhood of a node can be approximated using a
tree-like structure.9 For notational ease, we denote the fraction
of population d ∈ D that adopts action a ∈ A (i.e., xd,a/md)
by gd,a and the fraction of unprotected population d ∈ D (i.e.,
(xd,N + xd,I)/md = gd,N + gd,I ) by gd,U hereafter.
First, for k = 1,
Γ1(x) = τDA · γ(x), (2)
where
γ(x) = βIA
(∑
d∈D
wd
(
gd,P p
i
P + gd,U p
i
U
))
= βIA
(
piU −
∆p
davg ·
∑
d′∈Dmd′
∑
d∈D
d · xd,P
)
, (3)
∆p := piU − piP > 0, and davg :=
∑
d∈D d · fd is the
average or mean degree of the populations. Note that, from
the above assumption,
∑
d∈D wd ·gd,P (resp.
∑
d∈D wd ·gd,U )
is the probability that a randomly chosen neighbor is protected
(resp. unprotected). By its definition, γ(x) is the probability
that a node will see an indirect attack from a (randomly
selected) neighbor in the event that the neighbor experiences
an attack first. Similar models have been used extensively in
the literature (e.g., [44], [45]). Thus, if the degree of node
i is di ∈ D, the expected number of indirect attacks node
i suffers as a one-hop neighbor of the victims of successful
direct attacks can be approximated using di · Γ1(x).
Other Γk(x), k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, can be computed in an
analogous fashion. Suppose that the neighbor j of node i
has degree dj ∈ D. Then, by similar reasoning, the expected
number of indirect attacks node j suffers as an immediate
neighbor of the victims of successful direct attacks other than
node i is (dj − 1)Γ1(x). Hence, the expected number of
indirect attacks node i sees as a two-hop neighbor of the
victims of successful direct attacks through a single neighbor
8A more careful analysis of the degree distribution of a randomly selected
neighbor is carried out in [32], which suggests that it is somewhat different
from what we use here as an approximation. However, for large networks
without isolated nodes, this discrepancy in distributions should be small.
9As stated in Section I, this assumption may not hold in some of real-world
networks as reported in [36], [43]. But, we make this assumption to facilitate
our analysis. The same assumption is introduced in [16], [44], [45] as well.
is given by
βIA
(∑
d∈D
wd
(
gd,P p
i
P + gd,U p
i
U
)× (d− 1)Γ1(x))
= Γ1(x) · βIA
(∑
d∈D
wd(d− 1)
(
gd,P p
i
P + gd,U p
i
U
))
.
Following a similar argument and making use of assumed tree-
like K-hop neighborhood structure, we have the following
recursive equation for k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,K}:
Γk(x)
= Γk−1(x) · βIA
(∑
d∈D
wd(d− 1)
(
gd,P p
i
P + gd,U p
i
U
))
= Γk−1(x) λ(x) = Γ1(x) λ(x)k−1, (4)
where
λ(x) := βIA
(∑
d∈D
wd(d− 1)
(
gd,P p
i
P + gd,U p
i
U
))
= βIA
(∑
d∈D
wd(d− 1)
(
piU − gd,P∆p
))
. (5)
Define
e(x) =
1
τDA
K∑
k=1
Γk(x) = γ(x)
K∑
k=1
λ(x)k−1 (6)
=
{
γ(x) 1−λ(x)
K
1−λ(x) if λ(x) 6= 1,
K · γ(x) if λ(x) = 1.
We call e(x) the (risk) exposure from a neighbor at social state
x. It captures the expected total number of indirect attacks a
player experiences through a single (randomly chosen) neigh-
bor given that all nodes suffer a direct attack with probability
one (i.e., τDA = 1).
We point out two observations regarding the risk exposure.
Recall that gd,P = xd,P /md, d ∈ D, denotes the fraction of
population d which is protected. First, from its definition in (6)
and eqs. (2) - (5), the exposure is determined by (xd,P ; d ∈
D) or, equivalently, (gd,P ; d ∈ D), without having to know
(xd,I ; d ∈ D) or (xd,N ; d ∈ D); each summand in (6) can be
computed from γ(x) and λ(x), both of which are determined
by (xd,P ; d ∈ D) or (gd,P ; d ∈ D) according to (3) and
(5). Second, the risk exposure is strictly decreasing in each
xd,P , d ∈ D; due to the minus sign in front of xd,P in (3)
and gd,P in (5), γ(x) (resp. λ(x)) is strictly decreasing (resp.
nonincreasing) in xd,P , d ∈ D.
We assume that the costs of a player due to multiple
successful attacks are additive and that the players are risk
neutral.10 Hence, the expected cost of a player from indirect
attacks is proportional to e(x) and its degree. Based on this
observation, we adopt the following cost function for our
10While we assume that the players are risk neutral to simplify the proofs
of our analytical findings in Section IV, risk aversion can be modeled by
altering the cost function and similar qualitative findings can be reached at
the expense of more cumbersome proofs; when they are risk averse, we expect
the percentage of population investing in protection or purchasing insurance
to increase, the extent of which will depend on the level of risk aversion.
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population game: For any given social state x ∈ X , the cost
of a player with degree d ∈ D playing a ∈ A is given by
Cd,a(x)
=
 τDA (1 + d · e(x))LP + cP if a = P,τDA (1 + d · e(x))LU if a = N,
τDA (1 + d · e(x))LU + cI − Ins(x, d) if a = I,
(7)
where cP and cI denote the cost of protection and insurance
premium, respectively, and Ins : X × D → IR is a mapping
that determines (expected) insurance payout as a function of
social state and degree. Note that τDA (1 + d · e(x)) is the
expected number of attacks seen by a node with degree d,
including both direct and indirect attacks.
We assume that the insurance payout for an insured player
of degree d ∈ D is given by
Ins(x, d) = min
(
Covmax, ξcov(Cd,N (x)− ded)+
)
,
x ∈ X , (8)
where Covmax is the maximum loss/damage covered by the
insurance policy, ded is the deductible amount, ξcov ∈ (0, 1] is
the coverage level, i.e., the fraction of total damage over the
deductible amount covered by the insurance (up to Covmax),
and (z)+ denotes max(0, z). Recall that Cd,N (x) is the cost
a node of degree d sees from attacks when unprotected. As
one might expect, the difference in costs between actions N
and I is equal to the insurance premium minus the insurance
payout, i.e., cI−Ins(x, d). Moreover, it is clear from (3) - (8)
that the cost of a player depends on both its own security level
(i.e., protection vs. no protection) and those of other players
through the exposure e(x).
B. Solution concept - Nash equilibria
We employ a popular solution concept for our study, namely
Nash equilibria. A social state x? is an NE if it satisfies the
condition that, for all d ∈ D and a ∈ A,
x?d,a > 0 implies Cd,a(x
?) = min
a′∈A
Cd,a′(x
?). (9)
The existence of an NE in a population game is always
guaranteed [35, Theorem 2.1.1, p. 24].
We discuss an important observation that facilitates our
study. From (3) - (8), the cost function also has a scale
invariance property, i.e., C(x) = C(φ · x) for all φ > 0.
This offers a scalable model that permits us to examine the
effects of various system parameters (e.g., degree distribution
of nodes, parameter K and IAP βIA) on NEs without suffering
from the curse of dimensionality even when the population
sizes are very large: Suppose that NE? denotes the set of
NEs for a given population size vector m1. Then, the set of
NEs for another population size vector m2 = φ ·m1 for some
φ > 0 is given by
{
φ · x˜ | x˜ ∈ NE?}. This in turn means that
the set of NEs scaled by the inverse of the total population size
is the same for all population size vectors with the identical
degree distribution. For this reason, it suffices to study the
NEs for population size vectors whose sum is equal to one,
i.e.,
∑
d∈Dmd = 1. We will make use of this observation in
our analysis in Sections IV and V.
Assumption 1: We assume that the population size vectors
are normalized so that the total population size is one.
Note that Assumption 1 implies that the population size
vector m and its degree distribution f(m) are identical. Hence,
a population size vector also serves as the degree distribution.
C. Cascades of infection
Our model described in the previous subsections aims to
capture the interaction between strategic players in IDS scenar-
ios under the assumption that infections typically do not spread
more than K hops. However, some malwares may disseminate
unnoticed (for example, using so-called zero-day exploits [3])
or benefit from slow responses by software developers. When
they are allowed to proliferate unhindered for an extended
period, they may reach a greater portion of the network than
typical infections or malwares can. In this subsection, we
investigate whether or not such malwares can spread to a large
number of nodes in the network by determining when cascades
of infection are possible.
In order to simplify the analysis, we follow an approach
similar to the one employed in [44]. Rather than analyzing a
large finite network, we consider an infinite network in which
the degree of each node is d with probability fd(m) = md,
d ∈ D, independently of each other. By the strong law of large
numbers, the fraction of nodes with degree d converges to md
almost surely for all d ∈ D. The elements xd,a, d ∈ D and
a ∈ A, of the social state x can now be interpreted as the
fraction of nodes that have degree d and play action a. Using
this model, we look for a condition under which the probability
that the number of infected nodes diverges is strictly positive.
We call this the cascade condition.
Fix social state x ∈ X . When there is no confusion,
we omit the dependence on the social state x for notational
convenience. Suppose that we randomly choose a node, say
i, and then randomly select one of its neighbors, say node
j. As argued in Section III-A, the probability that node j is
vulnerable, i.e., it will be infected if attacked, is given by∑
d∈D
wd
(
gd,P · piP + (1− gd,P ) piU
)
= γ(x)/βIA.
Suppose that we initially infect node i, and let the infection
work its way through the network via indirect attacks (with
no constraint on K). We call the resulting set of all infected
nodes the infected cluster. When the size of infected cluster
is infinite, we say that a cascade of infection took place.
In our model, the nodes are strategic players and can change
their actions in response to those of other nodes. Therefore,
how widely an infection can disseminate starting with a single
infected node, depends on the actions taken by the nodes at
social state x, which are interdependent via their objectives.
We are interested in exploring how (a) the probability of
cascade at NEs and (b) the POA/POS vary as we change (i)
the node degree distribution, (ii) parameter K and (iii) IAP
βIA. This study can be carried out under assumptions similar
to those in [22], [44], [45] as explained below.
Following analogous steps as in [44], we assume that the
infected cluster has a tree-like structure with no cycle. As
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argued in [44], this is a reasonable approximation when the
cluster is sparsely connected.
  
node i
node j
- infected node
- uninfected node
node l
Fig. 1. Infected subcluster containing node j and its size Cj .
Denote the set of node i’s neighbors byNi. For each j ∈ Ni,
let Cj be the size of the infected subcluster including node j
after removing the remaining cluster connected to node j by
the edge between nodes i and j. An example is shown in
Fig. 1. In the figure, the infected subcluster containing node
j lies inside the dotted red curve. In this example, Cj = 3.
When neighbor j is not infected, we set Cj = 0. It is clear
that a cascade of infection or contagion happens if and only
if Cj =∞ for some j ∈ Ni.
When a neighbor j is infected, the number of k-hop neigh-
bors of node j in the aforementioned infected subcluster can
be viewed as the size of k-th generation in Galton-Watson (G-
W) model [17], [42], starting with a single individual: Suppose
that node j is infected by node i and that node ` is a k-hop
neighbor of node j in the infected subcluster that includes node
j, for some k ∈ Z+. When k = 0, node ` is node j itself.
Let N denote the number of node `’s infected neighbors that
are k + 1 hops away from node j in the same subcluster and
contract the infection from node `. In the example of Fig. 1,
node ` is one-hop away from node j and the rv N = 1.
From its construction, the distribution of N does not depend
on k, and its probability mass function (PMF) qN : IR→ [0, 1]
is given by
qN (n)
=

∑
d∈{n+1,...,Dmax} w
in
d
(
d−1
n
)
γ(x)n(1− γ(x))d−1−n
if n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Dmax − 1},
0 otherwise,
where γ(x) is the aforementioned probability that the infection
of a node is transmitted to a neighbor, and win = (wind ; d ∈
D) with
wind =
wd(gd,P p
i
P + gd,U p
i
U )∑
d′∈D wd′(gd′,P p
i
P + gd′,U p
i
U )
(10)
=
βIA · wd(gd,P piP + gd,U piU )
γ(x)
, d ∈ D.
Note that, by definition, wind , d ∈ D, is the probability that
a neighboring node has degree d conditional on it being a
victim of a successful indirect attack; the numerator of (10) is
the probability that a neighbor has a degree d and is vulnerable
to infection.
The number of k-hop neighbors in the infected subcluster
containing node j, which we denote by Ckj , k ∈ IN, can now
be studied using the G-W model. In Fig. 1, Ckj = 1 for
k ∈ {1, 2} and Ckj = 0 for k ≥ 3. Each individual representing
an infected node produces n, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Dmax − 1},
offsprings according to the PMF qN . Consequently, the prob-
ability P [Cj <∞] is given by the smallest nonnegative root
of the equation QN (s) = s [17, p. 173], where
QN (s) =
∑
n∈Z+
qN (n) s
n, s ∈ IR for which the sum
converges.
This solution, denoted by s?(x), always lies in [0, 1]. More-
over, s?(x) = 1 if (i) E [N ] < 1 or (ii) E [N ] = 1 and
qN (1) 6= 1. When E [N ] > 1, we have s?(x) < 1.
By conditioning on the degree of the initial infected node,
namely node i, we obtain
P [cascade takes place at social state x]
= 1−
∑
d∈D
fd
(
1− γ(x)(1− s?(x)))d. (11)
Therefore, assuming γ(x) > 0, E [N ] > 1 is a sufficient
condition for the cascade probability to be strictly positive.
In addition, except for in uninteresting degenerate cases,
E [N ] > 1 is also a necessary condition. We mention that
the task of determining whether a cascade is possible or not
can be carried out without explicitly computing the PMF qN
by noting that E [N ] is also equal to
∑
d∈D w
in
d (d− 1)γ(x).
Before we proceed, we summarize questions we are inter-
ested in exploring with help of the population game model
described in this section:
Q1 Is there a unique NE? If not, what is the structure of
NEs?
Q2 What is the relation between the degree of a node and its
equilibrium action? How do the parameters K and βIA,
which govern the propagation of infections, influence the
choices of different populations at NEs?
Q3 What is the POA/POS? How do the network properties
and system parameters affect the POA/POS?
Q4 How do network properties, in particular the node degree
distribution and average degree, and system parameters
shape the resultant probability of cascade at NEs?
IV. MAIN ANALYTICAL RESULTS
This section aims at providing partial answers to questions
Q1 through Q3 based on analytical findings. Before we state
our main results, we first state the assumption we impose
throughout this and following sections.
Assumption 2: The following inequalities hold.
a. LP < (1− ξcov) LU ; and
b. cP > cI + ded.
Assumption 2-a states that when a player is attacked, its
expected cost is smaller when it is protected than when it
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is insured. This implies that the coverage level is less than
100 percent even when insured. We note that, in addition
to deductibles, coinsurance (i.e., ξcov < 1) is often used to
mitigate the issue of moral hazard [23] by sharing risk between
both the insurer and the insured.11 Shetty et al. showed that,
in the presence of informational asymmetry, only a portion
of damages would be covered by insurance at an equilibrium
[39]. Assumption 2-b indicates that the investment a player
needs to make in order to protect itself against possible attacks
is larger than the insurance premium plus the deductible
amount. We believe that these are reasonable assumptions in
many cases.
We first examine the structure of NEs of the population
games and the effects of parameters K and βIA on NEs in
Section IV-A. Then, we investigate the social optimum and
(an upper bound on) the POA/POS as a function of system
parameters in Sections IV-B and IV-C, respectively.
A. Population games
Theorem 1: Let m ∈ IRDmax+ be a population size vector
and x? ∈ X be a corresponding NE for some K ∈ IN and
βIA ∈ (0, 1]. If x?d1,P > 0 for some d1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Dmax−1},
then x?d,P = md for all d > d1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to that of Theorem 1 in
[22] and is omitted.
We note that Theorem 1 also implies the following: If
x?d2,P < md2 for some d2 ∈ {2, . . . , Dmax}, then x?d,P = 0
for all d < d2.
In practice, the exposure of a node to indirect attacks will
depend on many factors, including not only its own degree,
but also the degrees and protection levels of its neighbors.
Therefore, even the nodes with the same degree may behave
differently. However, one would expect that the nodes with
larger degrees will likely see higher exposures to indirect
attacks and, as a result, have a stronger incentive to invest
in protecting themselves against (indirect) attacks. Theorem 1
captures this intuition.
The following theorem suggests that, although an NE may
not be unique, the size of each population d ∈ D investing
in protection is identical at all NEs. Its proof follows from a
straightforward modification of that of Theorem 2 in [22], and
is omitted.
Theorem 2: Suppose that x1 and x2 are two NEs of the
same population game. Then, x1d,P = x
2
d,P for all d ∈ D.
The uniqueness of the sizes of protected populations at NEs
shown in Theorem 2 is crucial for our study. It implies that
the cascade probability, which we adopt as a (global) measure
of network security, is identical at all NEs even when there is
more than one NE. For this reason, it enables us to examine
and compare the network security measured using cascade
probabilities, as we vary the node degree distribution and
parameters K and βIA.
11Another way to deal with the issue of moral hazard is premium discrim-
ination that ties the insurance premium directly with the security measures
adopted by a player as suggested in [4], [27].
Let us explain briefly why an NE is not necessarily unique.
Suppose that the expected cost of playing I and N is the same
and is smaller than that of playing P for some population d
at an NE. Then, there are uncountably many NEs. This is
a consequence of an earlier observation that a purchase of
insurance by a player does not affect the costs of other players,
hence their (optimal) responses.
Because the populations choosing to protect remain the
same at all NEs (when more than one NE exist) and the
issues of interest to us depend only on populations invest-
ing in protection, with a little abuse of notation, we use
N(m,K, βIA) = (Nd,a(m,K, βIA); d ∈ D and a ∈ A) to
denote any arbitrary NE corresponding to a population size
vector m, K ∈ IN and βIA ∈ (0, 1], where Nd,a(m,K, βIA)
is the size of population d playing action a at the NE.
Theorems 1 and 2 state that, for fixed population size vector
m and parameters K and βIA, there exists a degree threshold
given by
dNE(m,K, βIA) = min{d ∈ D | Nd,P (m,K, βIA) > 0}
such that only the populations with degree greater than or
equal to the threshold would invest in protection at any NE.
When the set on the right-hand side (RHS) is empty, we set
dNE(m,K, βIA) = Dmax + 1. The existence of a degree
threshold also greatly simplifies the computation of NEs,
which are not always easy to compute in general.
The following theorem sheds some light on how the degree
threshold dNE(m,K, βIA) behaves with varying K or βIA.
Theorem 3: Suppose K1,K2 ∈ IN with K1 ≤ K2. Then,
for any population size vector m and IAP βIA ∈ (0, 1], we
have∑
d∈D
Nd,P (m,K1, βIA) ≤
∑
d∈D
Nd,P (m,K2, βIA).
Similarly, for any population size vector m and K ∈ IN,∑
d∈D
Nd,P (m,K, β
1
IA) ≤
∑
d∈D
Nd,P (m,K, β
2
IA)
if 0 < β1IA ≤ β2IA ≤ 1.
Proof: A proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3 is quite intuitive; as K or βIA increases, the
effect of a successful direct attack is felt by a larger portion
of the populations. Consequently, for any fixed social state x,
the exposure e(x) grows with K and βIA. As a result, some
of population that would not invest in protection with smaller
K or βIA will see greater benefits of protecting themselves
because the cost of action N or I increases faster than that
of P by Assumption 2. Consequently, a larger fraction of
population chooses protection. However, as we will show in
Section V-B, these two parameters have very different effects
on the resulting cascade probability.
B. Social optimum
In this subsection, we consider a scenario where there is
a single social player (SP) that makes the decisions for all
populations. The goal of the SP is to minimize the overall
social cost given as the sum of (i) damages/losses from attacks
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and (ii) the cost of protection. In other words, the social cost
at social state x ∈ X is given by
SC(x)
=
∑
d∈D
[(∑
a∈A
xd,a ·Cd,a(x)
)
+ xd,I
(
Ins(x, d)− cI
)]
(12)
=
∑
d∈D
(
xd,P ·Cd,P (x) + (md − xd,P )Cd,N (x)
)
. (13)
Note that
∑
d∈D xd,I (Ins(x, d)− cI) in (12) is the (net) cost
for insurer(s). Hence, the social cost given by (12) accounts
for the costs of all players, including the insurer(s).
Moreover, it is clear from (13) that the social cost depends
only on xd,P , d ∈ D, as insurance simply shifts some of the
risk from the insured to the insurer as pointed out earlier. For
this reason, we can limit the possible atomic actions of SP
to {P,N} and simplify the admissible action space of SP to
Y := ∏d∈D[0,md]. An SP action y = (yd; d ∈ D) ∈ Y
specifies the size of each population d that should invest in
protection (i.e., yd) with an understanding that the remaining
population md − yd plays N .
Let us define a mapping X : Y → X , where
Xd,a(y) =
 yd if a = P,md − yd if a = N,
0 if a = I.
Fix an SP action y ∈ Y . The social cost associated with y is
given by a mapping SC : Y → IR, where
SC(y) = SC
(
X(y)
)
=
∑
d∈D
(
yd ·Cd,P
(
X(y)
)
+ (md − yd)Cd,N
(
X(y)
))
. (14)
The goal of SP is then to solve the following constrained
optimization problem.
SP-OPT:
min
y∈Y
SC(y) (15)
Let y? ∈ arg miny∈Y SC(y) denote any minimizer of the
social cost. When we wish to make the dependence of y? on
the population size vector m, parameter K or IAP βIA clear,
we shall use y?(m,K, βIA).
The following theorem reveals that, like NEs, any minimizer
y? has a degree threshold so that only the populations with
degree greater than or equal to the degree threshold should
protect at the social optimum.
Let d† = min{d ∈ D | y?d > 0}. As before, if the set on
the RHS is empty, we set d† = Dmax + 1.
Theorem 4: If d† < Dmax, y?d = md for all d > d
†.
Proof: A proof is provided in Appendix B.
We can prove the uniqueness of the minimizer y? by making
use of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5: There exists a unique solution y?(m,K, βIA)
to the SP-OPT problem.
Proof: Please see Appendix C for a proof.
While the statements of Theorems 4 and 5 are similar to
those of Theorems 4 and 5 in [22], the proofs in [22] do not
apply to the settings in this paper.
The following theorem tells us that the protected population
size is never smaller at the social optimum than at an NE. Its
proof is similar to that of Theorem 7 in [22] and is omitted.
Theorem 6: Fix a population size vector m, K ∈ IN
and βIA ∈ (0, 1]. Let x? = N(m,K, βIA) and y? =
y?(m,K, βIA). Then,
∑
d∈D x
?
d,P ≤
∑
d∈D y
?
d .
Theorem 6 tells us that the damages/losses due to attacks
are higher at NEs than at the system optimum. Hence, because
the system optimum is unique, the savings from smaller invest-
ments in protection at NEs (compared to system optimum) are
outweighed by the increases in damages. Thus, the network
security degrades as a result of selfish nature of the players
as suggested in [26], [27]. This naturally leads to our next
question: How efficient are NEs in comparison to the social
optimum?
C. Price of anarchy
Inefficiency of NEs is well documented, e.g., [14], [19],
[31, Chap. 17-21], [34]. In particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
illustrates this clearly [33]. However, in some cases, the
inefficiency of NEs can be bounded by finite POA/POS [20].
Recall that because all NEs achieve the same social cost in
the population games we consider by virtue of Theorem 2, the
POA and POS are identical. We are interested in investigating
the relation between system parameters, including degree
distribution f , K and βIA, and the POA.
Theorem 7: Let m be a population size vector and davg be
the average degree of the populations. Suppose cP ≥ ∆L·τDA.
Then, for any K ∈ IN and βIA ∈ (0, 1],
SC
(
N(m,K, βIA)
)
SC
(
y?(m,K, βIA)
) ≤ 1 + davg · emax(m,K, βIA), (16)
where
emax(m,K, βIA) = βIA p
i
U
K−1∑
k=0
(
βIA p
i
U
davg
∑
d∈D
d(d− 1)md
)k
is the largest possible exposure nodes can see when no
population invests in protection, i.e., xd,P = 0 for all d ∈ D.
Proof: A proof is given in Appendix D.
The assumption cP ≥ ∆L·τDA in the theorem is reasonable
because it merely requires that the insurance premium is at
least the difference in the expected losses sustained only from
a direct attack, not including any additional expected losses
a player may incur from indirect attacks. Since a private
insurer will likely charge a premium high enough to recoup
the average insurance payout for insured players, the premium
will need to be higher than ξcov
(
τDA(1+d
ins
avg·e(x))LU−ded
)
,
where dinsavg is the average degree of insured players. Therefore,
assuming that ξcov is not too small and/or the deductible is not
too large, the premium is likely to be at least ∆L · τDA.
The upper bound on POA in Theorem 7 is tight in the
sense that there are examples where the POA is equal to the
bound. We will provide a numerical example in Section V-C,
for which the POA is close to our bound in the theorem.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use numerical examples to i) verify our
findings in Theorems 1, 3 and 7 and ii) illustrate how cascade
probability is shaped by system parameters. For the first three
examples in Sections V-A through V-C, we use a family of
(truncated) power law degree distributions given by
{
mα; α ∈
[0, 3]
}
, where mαd ∝ d−α, d ∈ D. Over the years, it has been
suggested that many of both natural and engineered networks
have a power law degree distribution (e.g., [1], [24]). Using
Lemma 3 in Appendix D of [22], one can easily show that
the degree distribution f(mα) becomes smaller in the usual
stochastic order [37] with increasing α. This implies that the
average degree decreases with α, which ranges from 1.33 (for
α = 3) to 10.5 (for α = 0) with Dmax = 20. For the last
example in Section V-D, we adopt a family of (truncated)
Poisson degree distributions parameterized by λ ∈ [1.1, 10.6].
Also, we would like to mention that, although we assume
piP = 0 and p
i
U = 1 for our numerical examples presented
here, similar qualitative results hold when other values satis-
fying piP < p
i
U are used.
A. Cascade probability, degree threshold, and protected pop-
ulation size
The parameter values used in the first example are provided
in Table II.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
τDA 0.95 piU 1.0 p
i
P 0
ξcov 0.8 ded 20 Covmax 500
LP 10 LU 100 βIA 0.85
cP 300 cI 40 Dmax 20
TABLE II
PARAMETER VALUES FOR FIRST NUMERICAL EXAMPLE.
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Fig. 2. Plot of (a) degree threshold dNE(mα,K, βIA), (b) fraction of
protected populations, (c) probability of cascade, and (d) E [N ].
Fig. 2 plots (a) degree threshold dNE(mα,K, βIA), (b) the
fraction of total population that invests in protection at NEs, (c)
cascade probability given by (11), and (d) E [N ] (discussed in
Section III-C) as a function of the parameter K and the power
law parameter α. It is clear from Fig. 2(a) that, with other
parameters fixed, the degree threshold dNE(mα,K, βIA) is
nonincreasing in K. This leads to a larger fraction of total
population investing in protection (Fig. 2(b)) with increasing
K as proved in Theorem 3. In addition, Fig. 2(c) shows
diminishing cascade probability with increasing K.
Fig. 2(b) also suggests that the fraction of protected popula-
tion in general goes up with an increasing average degree (or,
equivalently, decreases with the power law parameter α). From
this observation, one might expect the cascade probability
to diminish with the average degree. Surprisingly, Fig. 2(c)
indicates that the cascade probability climbs with an increasing
average degree at the same time.
We suspect that this somewhat counterintuitive observation
is a consequence of what we see in Fig. 2(a): Over the
parameter settings where the cascade probability is nonzero,
the degree threshold dNE(mα,K, βIA) generally rises with
the average degree. This suggests that, even though more
of the population invests in protection, because nodes with
increasing degrees, but smaller than the degree thresholds
are still unprotected and vulnerable, it becomes easier for an
infection to propagate throughout the network with the help
of such vulnerable nodes with increasing degrees.
B. Effects of indirect attack probability βIA
In the second example, we vary IAP βIA while keeping the
values of other parameters the same as in the first example.
Our aim is to investigate how the IAP influences the cascade
probability and the fraction of protected population and com-
pare it to the effects of parameter K.
Fig. 3 shows the cascade probability and the fraction of
population investing in protection as IAP βIA and parameter
K are varied for three different values of α (α = 0.2, 1.2 and
2.2).
We point out three observations. First, as alluded to in
the first example, the cascade probability decreases with α,
as does the fraction of protected population. As mentioned
in Section II, this observation is in sharp contrast with the
findings by Watts [44]. Figs. 2 and 3 suggest that when
the nodes are strategic and can choose to protect themselves
to reduce the probability of infection, at least for certain
parameter regimes, the network becomes less stable in that
the cascade probability rises as the average degree increases
(i.e., α decreases) and the second (phase) transition observed
in [44] and described in Section II is missing.
Second, it is clear from Fig. 3 that, although a larger
fraction of population invests in protection with increasing βIA
as proved in Theorem 3, the cascade probability also rises.
What may be surprising at first sight is how differently the
parameters K and βIA affect cascade probability in spite of
the similarity in the way they influence the portion of protected
populations as illustrated in Fig. 3; while raising K results in
diminished cascade probability, increasing βIA leads to rising
cascade probability.
This can be explained as follows: Once other parameters
and social state are fixed, cascade probability does not depend
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Fig. 3. Plot of the cascade probability and the protected population size. (a)
α = 0.2, (b) α = 1.2, and (c) α = 2.2.
on K. Hence, increasing the protected population size reduces
cascade probability. On the other hand, with other parameters
and social state fixed, cascade probability climbs with βIA.
Thus, although the fraction of protected population increases
with βIA, because the nodes are strategic, they do not invest
enough in protection to keep cascade probability from rising.
This can be partially inferred from growing inefficiency of
NEs as hinted by the upper bound on POA in Theorem 7.
Third, Fig. 3 indicates that the effect of IAP is more
pronounced when the average degree is larger in the sense that
cascade probability rises more quickly with the IAP (when it is
small). This is intuitive; when the network is highly connected,
it provides an infection with a greater number of paths through
which the infection can spread. Hence, even when the IAP is
relatively small, it will be able to propagate throughout the
network more easily.
C. Price of anarchy
In the next example, we examine the POA as the average
degree of nodes varies. We set K = 5 for this example. The
values of other parameters are listed in Table III. For this
example, we purposely choose parameter values so that the
POA is close to its upper bound.
Fig. 4 plots (a) degree threshold dNE(mα, 5, 0.1), (b)
fraction of protected population, and (c) POA and its bound
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
τDA 0.9 piU 1.0 p
i
P 0
ξcov 0.95 ded 5 Covmax 500
LP 5 LU 95 βIA 0.1
cP 88 cI 80 Dmax 20
TABLE III
PARAMETER VALUES FOR FIRST NUMERICAL EXAMPLE.
in Theorem 7. We change the x-axis to average degree so that
it is easier to see the effect of average degree on the realized
POA and the bound. Recall that the average degree decreases
with increasing α.
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Fig. 4. Plot of (a) degree thresholds, (b) fraction of protected population,
and (c) POA.
First, it is obvious from Fig. 4(c) that both the POA
and the bound grow much faster than linearly. Hence, while
a greater portion of populations elects to protect when α
is smaller (hence, the average degree is larger) as shown
in previous subsections, the cascade probability rises with
an increasing average degree, and so does the POA. These
findings suggest that when the nodes are strategic entities
interested only in minimizing their own costs, for keeping
the cascade probability small, it is better to have less evenly
distributed node degrees with fewer large-degree nodes.
Second, Figs. 4(b) and 4(c) tell us the following interesting
story. When α is small (i.e., the degree distribution is more
even), although nodes with degrees less than five, which ac-
count for about 20-30 percent of total population, do not invest
in protection at the system optimum, the POA closely tracks
the bound and rises rapidly with the average degree. Therefore,
there is an interesting trade-off one can observe: When the
degree distribution is less evenly distribution, the network
is held together by nodes with high degrees. Such networks
are shown to be robust against random attacks, but are more
vulnerable to coordinated attacks targeting high-degree nodes
[10], [11]. One possible way to mitigate the vulnerability is to
increase the connectivity of the network, hence, the average
degree. However, Fig. 4(a) indicates that increasing network
connectivity not only leads to higher cascade probability as
illustrated in previous subsections, but also results in a higher
social cost and greater POA, which is undesirable.
D. Poisson degree distribution
In the last example, we consider a family of (truncated)
Poisson degree distribution
{
mλ; λ ∈ [1.1, 10.6]}, where
mλd ∝ λd/d!, d ∈ D. The remaining parameters are identical
to those in Table II of Section V-A.
Fig. 5 shows (a) the degree threshold dNE(mλ,K, βIA)
and (b) the fraction of protected populations as a function of
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Fig. 5. Plot of (a) degree threshold dNE(mλ,K, βIA), and (b) fraction of
protected populations.
λ and K. Clearly, the percentage of protected population tends
to increase with the average degree (although there is no strict
monotonicity), which is consistent with an earlier observation
with power law degree distributions. In addition, the degree
threshold dNE(mλ,K, βIA) tends to climb with the average
degree.
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Fig. 6. Plot of cascade probability. (a) Poisson distributions, (b) power laws.
In Fig. 6, we plot the cascade probability for both (a)
Poisson distributions and (b) power laws. There are two obser-
vations we would like to point out. First, in the case of Poisson
distributions, the cascade probability shows a cyclic behavior.
While similar cyclic patterns exist with power law degree
distributions as well, they are more pronounced with Poisson
degree distributions. These cycles shown in Fig. 6(a) coincide
with the degree threshold dNE(mλ,K, βIA) in Fig. 5(a);
the dips in the cascade probability occur while the degree
threshold remains constant. We suspect that these cycles are a
side effect of a population game model that is a deterministic
model. Nonetheless, the two plots show similar general trends
and the cascade probability reveals an increasing trend with
the average degree for both power law and Poisson degree
distributions.
Second, the cascade probability exhibits higher sensitivity
with respect to the average degree, especially when the average
degree is small, in case of Poisson distributions. In other
words, as the average degree rises, the cascade probability
increases more rapidly with Poisson distributions than with
power laws. This suggests that, even for a fixed average degree,
the cascade probability is likely to depend very much on the
underlying degree distribution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied interdependent security with strategic agents. In
particular, we examined how various system parameters and
network properties shape the decisions of strategic agents and
resulting system security and social cost. We established the
existence of a degree threshold at both Nash equilibria and
social optima. Furthermore, we demonstrated the uniqueness
of social cost at Nash equilibria, although there could be more
than one Nash equilibrium. In addition, we derived an upper
bound on the POA, which increases superlinearly with the
average degree of nodes in general, and demonstrated that the
bound is tight. Finally, our study suggests that as the average
degree increases, despite a higher fraction of nodes investing
in protection at Nash equilibria, cascade probability also rises.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We only prove the first part of the theorem as the second part
follows from essentially an identical argument. Suppose that
the theorem is false for some population size vector m, IAP
βIA, and two distinct K1 and K2 satisfying 1 ≤ K1 < K2.
We will show that this results in a contradiction. In order to
make the dependence on the parameter K explicit, we denote
the cost function C(x) and the exposure e(x) by C(x;K) and
e(x;K), respectively. Moreover, for notational simplicity, we
denote N(m,Ki, βIA), i = 1, 2, by xi in this section.
We first state a property that will be used shortly.
Property P1: Suppose that x¯1 and x¯2 are two social states
such that e(x¯1) < e(x¯2). Then, the following inequalities hold,
which follow directly from the cost function given in (3) - (8)
and Assumption 2-a: For all d ∈ D,
0 < Cd,P (x¯
2)−Cd,P (x¯1) < Cd,I(x¯2)−Cd,I(x¯1)
≤ Cd,N (x¯2)−Cd,N (x¯1).
We point out that this property continues to hold even when
we compare social states for two different population sizes m1
and m2 or for different values of parameter K or βIA, which
satisfy the inequality in the exposures.
Let di = min{d ∈ D | xid,P > 0}, i = 1, 2, with an
understanding di = Dmax + 1 if xid,P = 0 for all d ∈ D.
Then, from the above assumption and Theorem 1, we must
have x2d1,P < x
1
d1,P
. By the definition of an NE,
Cd1,P (x
1;K1) ≤ min{Cd1,I(x1;K1), Cd1,N (x1;K1)}. (17)
From the assumption x2d,P ≤ x1d,P for all d ∈ D and
x2d1,P < x
1
d1,P
, we get e(x1;K1) < e(x2;K2). Therefore,
property P1 tells us
Cd1,P (x
2;K2)−Cd1,P (x1;K1)
< min
a∈{N,I}
(
Cd1,a(x
2;K2)−Cd1,a(x1;K1)
)
. (18)
Together with (17), the inequality in (18) yields
Cd1,P (x
2;K2) < min{Cd1,N (x2;K2), Cd1,I(x2;K2)}.
Obviously, this implies x2d1,P = md1 and, hence, contradicts
the assumption x2d1,P < x
1
d1,P
≤ md1 .
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We prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume that there
exists d′ > d† such that y?d′ < md′ . Suppose that  is a constant
satisfying 0 <  < min{y?d† , md′ − y?d′} and ud is a zero-
one vector whose only non-zero element is the d-th entry.
Let y† = y? + 
(
ud′ − ud†
)
. We will show that SC(y†) <
SC(y?), contradicting the assumption that y? is a minimizer
of the social cost. For notational simplicity, we write x† and
x? in place of X(y†) and X(y?), respectively, throughout this
section.
After a little algebra,
SC(y?)− SC(y†)
= τDA
(
e(x?)− e(x†))∑
d∈D
d (y?d LP + (md − y?d)LU )
+  τDA(d
′ − d†)e(x†)∆L. (19)
It is clear that the second term in (19) is strictly positive
because d′ > d†, e(x†) > 0 and ∆L > 0. Thus, to show that
(19) is nonnegative, it suffices to prove e(x†) < e(x?). To
this end, we demonstrate γ(x†) < γ(x?) and λ(x†) < λ(x?).
From (6), these inequalities imply e(x†) < e(x?).
First, from (3),
γ(x?)− γ(x†) =  βIA ∆p
davg
(
d′ − d†) > 0.
Second, from (5), we get
λ(x?)− λ(x†) =  βIA ∆p
davg
(
d′(d′ − 1)− d†(d† − 1)) > 0.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Suppose that the theorem is not true and there exist two
distinct minimizers y1 and y2. By Theorem 4, without loss
of generality, we assume i) y1d ≤ y2d for all d ∈ D and ii)
y1d < y
2
d for at least one d ∈ D. We will show that this
leads to a contradiction. Throughout this section, we denote
X(yi), i = 1, 2, by xi for notational simplicity.
Let di = min{d ∈ D | yid > 0}, i = 1, 2, with the
convention di = Dmax + 1 if yi = 0. Note that d2 ≤ Dmax
by assumption. Since y2d2 > 0, with a little abuse of notation,
the one-sided partial derivative of the social cost with respect
to yd2 at y2 satisfies
∂
∂yd2
SC(y2) := lim
δ↓0
SC(y2)− SC(y2 − δ · ud2)
δ
≤ 0
with the equality holding when y2d2 < md2 . Define another
one-sided partial derivative of the social cost with respect to
yd2 at y1 to be
∂
∂yd2
SC(y1) := lim
δ↓0
SC(y1 + δ · ud2))− SC(y1)
δ
.
Since y1 minimizes the social cost, ∂SC(y1)/∂yd2 ≥ 0. How-
ever, we will show that ∂SC(y1)/∂yd2 < ∂SC(y2)/∂yd2 ≤
0, leading to a contradiction.
From (14),
∂
∂yd2
SC(yi) = Cd2,P (x
i)−Cd2,N (xi) (20)
+
∑
d∈D
(
yid
∂
∂yd2
Cd,P (x
i) + (md − yid)
∂
∂yd2
Cd,N (x
i)
)
.
Using the cost function in (7), we obtain
∂
∂yd2
Cd,P (x
i) = τDA LP d
∂
∂yd2
e(xi), and
∂
∂yd2
Cd,N (x
i) = τDA LU d
∂
∂yd2
e(xi).
Here, ∂e(xi)/∂yd2 and ∂Cd,a(xi)/∂yd2 , a ∈ {P,N}, are
appropriate one-sided partial derivatives. Substituting these in
(20),
∂
∂yd2
SC(yi) = cP − τDA
(
1 + d2 e(xi)
)
∆L (21)
+
∑
d∈D
τDA d
(
yid LP + (md − yid)LU
) ∂
∂yd2
e(xi).
We rewrite ∂SC(y1)/∂yd2 in a more convenient form for
our purpose.
∂
∂yd2
SC(y1) = cP − τDA
(
1 + d2 e(x1)
)
∆L
+
∑
d∈D
τDA d
(
y2d LP + (md − y2d)LU + (y2d − y1d)∆L
)
× ∂
∂yd2
e(x1)
Using the above expression,
∂
∂yd2
SC(y2)− ∂
∂yd2
SC(y1)
= τDA d
2 ∆L
(
e(x1)− e(x2))
−
∑
d∈D
τDA d
[ (
y2d LP + (md − y2d)LU
)
(22)
×
(
∂
∂yd2
e(x1)− ∂
∂yd2
e(x2)
)
+(y2d − y1d)∆L
∂
∂yd2
e(x1)
]
.
Because y1 ≤ y2, where the inequality is element-wise,
and y2d2 > y
1
d2 , we have e(x
2) < e(x1) and the first term in
(22) is positive. Moreover, from the definition of the exposure
in (6), it is clear ∂e(x1)/∂yd2 < 0. Thus, in order to prove
(22) > 0, it suffices to show ∂e(x1)/∂yd2 < ∂e(x2)/∂yd2 .
∂
∂yd2
e(xi)
=
(
∂
∂yd2
γ(xi)
)K−1∑
k=0
λ(xi)k + γ(xi)
K−1∑
k=0
∂
∂yd2
λ(xi)k
= −βIA ∆p d
2
davg
[
K−1∑
k=0
λ(xi)k (23)
+γ(xi)(d2 − 1)
K−1∑
k=1
k λ(xi)k−1
]
.
As γ(x2) < γ(x1) and λ(x2) < λ(x1), we have from (23)
the desired inequality ∂e(x1)/∂yd2 < ∂e(x2)/∂yd2 .
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Let x? = N(m,K, βIA) be an NE and y? =
y?(m,K, βIA) for notational convenience. Also, we write
e(y?) in place of e(X(y?)). By slightly rewriting the social
costs given by (13) and (14), we obtain
SC(y?) = (cP −∆L τDA)
∑
d∈D
y?d + τDA LU
+τDA LU davg e(y
?)−∆L τDA e(y?)
∑
d∈D
d · y?d
and
SC(x?) =
(
cP −∆L τDA
)∑
d∈D
x?d,P + τDA LU
+τDA LU davg e(x
?)−∆L τDA e(x?)
∑
d∈D
d · x?d,P .
We first derive an upper bound on the difference SC(x?) −
SC(y?) followed by a lower bound on SC(y?).
Subtracting SC(y?) from SC(x?),
SC(x?)− SC(y?)
=
(
cP −∆L τDA
)(∑
d∈D
x?d,P −
∑
d∈D
y?d
)
+∆L τDA
(
e(y?)
∑
d∈D
(y?d · d)− e(x?)
∑
d∈D
(x?d,P · d)
)
+τDA LU davg
(
e(x?)− e(y?)).
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From Theorems 2, 4 and 6, we know x?d,P ≤ y?d . Hence,
together with the assumption cP ≥ ∆L τDA, we get
SC(x?)− SC(y?)
≤ ∆L τDA
(
e(y?)
∑
d∈D
(y?d · d)− e(x?)
∑
d∈D
(x?d,P · d)
)
+τDA LU davg
(
e(x?)− e(y?)). (24)
We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: e(y?)
∑
d∈D(y
?
d · d) ≥ e(x?)
∑
d∈D(x
?
d,P · d) – In
this case, we have
(24) ≤ LU τDA
(
e(y?)
∑
d∈D
(y?d · d)− e(x?)
∑
d∈D
(x?d,P · d)
)
+τDA LU davg
(
e(x?)− e(y?))
= LU τDA
[
e(x?)
(
davg −
∑
d∈D
(x?d,P · d)
)
−e(y?)
(
davg −
∑
d∈D
(y?d · d)
)]
. (25)
From (25) it is clear that the maximum is achieved when x? =
0 and y? = m. Hence,
(24) ≤ τDA LU davg emax(m,K, βIA).
Case 2: e(y?)
∑
d∈D(y
?
d · d) < e(x?)
∑
d∈D(x
?
d,P · d) –
Under the assumption, it is obvious
(24) ≤ τDA LU davg
(
e(x?)− e(y?))
≤ τDA LU davg emax(m,K, βIA).
From these two cases, it is clear that
τDA LU davg emax(m,K, βIA) is an upper bound for
SC(x?)− SC(y?).
Since we assume cP ≥ ∆L τDA, we get the following lower
bound on SC(y?).
SC(y?) ≥ τDA LU + τDA e(y?)
(
LU · davg −∆L
∑
d∈D
d · y?d
)
≥ τDA LU ,
where the second inequality is a consequence of LU · davg ≥
∆L
∑
d∈D d · y?d .
Using the above upper bound on SC(x?) − SC(y?) and
the lower bound on SC(y?),
SC(x?)
SC(y?)
= 1 +
SC(x?)− SC(y?)
SC(y?)
≤ 1 + τDA LU davg emax(m,K, βIA)
τDA LU
= 1 + davg emax(m,K, βIA).
